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ARTICLES
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CONTINGENT ATTORNEYS' FEES: PATCHWORK
BY CONGRESS AND SUPREME COURT
CREATES UNCERTAINTY
Robert W. Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the changing landscape of the federal in-
come tax treatment of attorneys' fees. The tax treatment of con-
tingent legal fees has been rife with controversy for more than a
decade, with the last few years seeing several particularly mo-
mentous developments. The first major development was Con-
gress's enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 20041
(Jobs Act). Although legislators had been considering versions of
a bill to affect the tax treatment of attorneys' fees for years, 2 Con-
* Robert W. Wood practices law with Wood & Porter, in San Francisco, California (www.
woodporter.com), and is the author of TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS
(Tax Institute, 3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2006), available at http://www.damageawards.org. This discussion
is not intended as legal advice, and cannot be relied upon for any purpose without the services of a
qualified professional. Portions of this article are adapted from, or first appeared in, Robert W. Wood,
Jobs Act Attorney Fee Provision: Is it Enough?, 105 TAx NOTES 961 (2004).
1. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, 1547
(2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)).
2. See Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 1997, 106th Cong.; Civil Rights Tax
Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. 4570, 106th Cong.; Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2001, H.R. 840,
107th Cong.; Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, 108th Cong.
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gress finally acted upon such a bill only as the United States Su-
preme Court was also set to consider the issue.3
Suggesting that Congress acted only to save face might be an
exaggeration. Nevertheless, it took many years for Congress to
provide any relief on the tax treatment of attorneys' fees. 4 The
provision that was finally passed as part of the Jobs Act had been
proposed and re-proposed since 1999, when it was first introduced
as the Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 1999. 5 However, the issue
cried out long before that for attention.6
The second significant development began with the Court's
grant of certiorari in two attorneys' fees cases in 2004, Commis-
sioner v. Banks7 and Commissioner v. Banaitis.8 The two cases
were consolidated before the Court for briefing and argument.9
When the Court issued its unanimous opinion on January 24,
2005,10 the Court not only missed a chance to correct an appalling
tax problem, but it also created substantial uncertainty about pre-
cisely what kind of tax planning will be permitted to avoid the
general tax rule the Court announced.
The Jobs Act and the Banks decision both address the issue of
how the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) should treat contingent
attorneys' fees and costs paid by successful plaintiffs., Of course,
the lawyer must pay federal income tax on his or her legal fees
received. The question is how the client will be taxed. The issue
is of surprising prevalence, as it arises whenever lawsuit proceeds
in a settlement or judgment represent taxable income. Notwith-
standing section 104 of the Code and its personal physical injury
3. On March 29, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Comm'r v. Banks, 345
F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958 (2004), and in Comm'r v. Banaitis, 340
F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 958 (2004).
4. Taxpayers have had to include attorneys' fees in income in some circuits as far back
as O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963). As
noted in supra note 2, Congress began debating the issue in 1999.
5. See sources cited supra note 2.
6. News Release, Internal Revenue Service, National Taxpayer Advocate Releases An-
nual Report, IR 1999-08 (Jan. 12, 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/lists/
0,,id=98040,00.html.
7. 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
8. 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 958 (2004).
9. Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 426 (2005) (the consolidated cases will hereinafter
be referred to as Banks).
10. Id.
11. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-47
(2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)); Banks, 543 U.S. at 429. See also
Robert W. Wood, Taxation of Settlements and Judgments, 102 TAX NOTES 1120, 1120 (2004)
(discussing developments in the contingent attorney fee debate).
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exclusion, 12 most lawsuit proceeds received via settlement or judg-
ment represent taxable income.
Logic suggests that all expenses incurred to achieve this in-
come, including lawyers' fees and costs, would be deductible
against that income. However, prior to the Court's decision in
Banks, a majority of circuit courts held that a plaintiff could not
net legal fees against his or her recovery. 13 In these circuits, the
plaintiff had to generally include the gross recovery in income,
even if the legal fees were paid directly to the contingent-fee law-
yer.14 In contrast, a minority of circuits allowed plaintiffs to re-
port gross income measured only by their net recovery. 15 This
practice was usually based on the theory that a plaintiffs attorney
has an underlying interest in his percentage portion of the case,
and would in any case be taxed on his attorneys' fees. In Banks,
the Court agreed with the majority of the circuit courts, albeit
only as a general rule. 16
The difference between the net and gross approach to report-
ing attorneys' fees can be significant. Under net reporting, a suc-
cessful plaintiff reports gross income only in the net amount he
eventually keeps. Under gross reporting, the plaintiff reports the
entire settlement or judgment in gross income, and then takes a
deduction for the attorneys' fees and costs paid to counsel. Al-
though the plaintiff can deduct his attorneys' fees, the deduction
is generally a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which can be
claimed only to the extent it exceeds 2% of the plaintiffs adjusted
gross income. 17
Overall limits also apply to itemized deductions.1 ' Most dra-
conian of all, the alternative minimum tax (AMT) allows no deduc-
tion for miscellaneous itemized deductions. 19 The Jobs Act elimi-
12. I.R.C. § 104 (West 1994) (amended 1996).
13. See Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Raymond v. United States,
355 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963); Young v.
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001);
Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2000); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274
F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Davis v.
Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
2000); Comm'r v. Banaitis, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 958
(2004); Comm'r v. Banks, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
16. Banks, 543 U.S. at 429-30.
17. I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
18. Id. § 68. This limitation is generally referred to as "phaseout."
19. Id. § 56(b)(A)(i).
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nates these historical concerns in some cases. In other instances,
these problems will continue to plague taxpayers.
For example, suppose a plaintiff receives a gross award of
$100, owing 40% to his lawyer. Historically, a majority of circuit
courts held the plaintiff has $100 of gross income, and must claim
a deduction for the $40 paid to his attorney (even if his attorney is
paid directly out of the proceeds of the case, with the money never
passing through the plaintiffs hands).20 In the minority of cir-
cuits, the plaintiff only has $60 of gross income. 21 The tax differ-
ence between these seemingly equivalent economic results can be
dramatic. 22
The minority circuit taxpayer has gross income and taxable
income of $60. The majority circuit taxpayer has gross income of
$100 and a miscellaneous itemized deduction of $40, of which the
first 2% of adjusted gross income (or $2) would not be deductible. 23
On top of this 2% limit, this plaintiff may face phaseouts of deduc-
tions. 24 Finally, attorneys' fees will not be deductible for AMT
purposes.25
The latter point can actually turn a prevailing party in litiga-
tion into a financial loser. An often cited New York Times article
highlights the plight of a Chicago law enforcement officer who won
a sex discrimination suit, only to find that her recovery resulted in
her paying $99,000 more in taxes than she recovered in the suit.26
Such situations shriek of inequity and bear no relationship to
fundamentals of a fair tax system. The problems associated with
the tax treatment of attorneys' fees has led to endless academic
debates, numerous legislative assaults from various taxpayer
groups,27 a strident position announced by the U.S. Taxpayer Ad-
vocate, 28 and ultimately, to passage of the attorneys' fee provision
20. See cases cited supra note 13.
21. See cases cited supra note 15.
22. See Robert W. Wood, The Plight of the Plaintiff. The Tax Treatment of Legal Fees,
81 TAX NOTES 907, 907 (1998).
23. I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
24. Id. § 68.
25. Id. § 56(b)(A)(i).
26. Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2002, at 18 (discussing Spina v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d
764 (N.D. Ill. 2002)) (emphasis added).
27. See NAT'L TAxPAYER ADVoc.: FY 2002 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS, Dec. 31, 2002, at
161-71, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta 2002_annual report.pdf; see also
Taxpayers Against Fraud, www.taf.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
28. Id.; see also News Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS National Taxpayer Advo-
cate Releases Annual Report to Congress, IR 2003-2 (Jan. 6, 2003), available at http://www.
irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=105403,00.html.
Vol. 67
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of the Jobs Act. 29 Regrettably, the Jobs Act focuses solely on em-
ployment claims and cases arising from the Federal False Claims
Act. Even though attorneys' fees tax problems arise in many non-
employment cases, employment cases traditionally have served as
the poster child of inequity.
Although a taxpayer going out-of-pocket to pay taxes on a set-
tlement or judgment may be unusual, successful plaintiffs often
face a disproportionate tax burden on their recoveries compared to
the tax burden borne by other income. The magnitude of the prob-
lem varies with the following factors: (1) the size of the recovery;
(2) the percentage of contingent fees; (3) the amount of costs and
the way in which costs are applied under the fee agreement; (4)
the plaintiffs other income; and (5) the plaintiffs other deduc-
tions. Given contingent attorneys' fees and costs may be 40% or
50% of a recovery, and sometimes much higher,30 the problem is
manifest.
Prior to the Court's decision in Banks, the tax treatment of
attorneys' fees generated a decade of bitterly fought litigation,
leaving a deep rift in the circuit courts around the United
States.31 The lack of uniformity led to forum shopping and fre-
quent gerrymandering of attorneys' fees arrangements. 32 Al-
though the Jobs Act eliminates the attorneys' fee problem in some
cases, its scope is limited, with many cases escaping its relief.
Moreover, the general rule announced by the Court in Banks
makes clear that broader relief is needed. In the meantime, the
self-expressed limitations of the Banks opinion should give some
taxpayers hope that they may be able to distinguish their case
29. For a discussion of the above-the-line attorneys' fee deduction created by the Jobs
Act see Robert W. Wood, Jobs Act Attorney Fee Provision: Is it Enough?, 105 TAx NOTES
961, 961 (2004).
30. I have seen contingent attorneys' fees and costs as high as 73%.
31. The cases cited in supra note 13 followed the majority rule. The cases cited in supra
note 15 followed the minority rule. For additional discussion of pre-Banks tax treatment of
attorneys' fees see Robert W. Wood & Dominic L. Daher, IRS's MSSP on Lawsuit Awards,
Settlements: Useful as a Gelding at a Stud Farm, BNA DAILY TAx REPORT, Dec. 23, 2003, at
J-1; Robert W. Wood, Second Circuit Perpetuates Attorneys' Fee SNAFU, BNA DAILY TAX
REPORT, May 19, 2004, at J-1; Robert W. Wood & Dominic L. Daher, Attorneys' Fee Debacle
Keeps Going, Going, and Going as Mutinous Sixth Circuit Refuses Reliance on Lien Law
Analysis, BNA DAILY TAx REPORT, Jan. 20, 2004, at J-1; Robert W. Wood & Dominic L.
Daher, Another Bite at the Apple? Ninth Circuit Takes Another Look at the Attorneys' Fee
Fiasco and Changes Its Tune, TAX PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Apr.-May 2004, at 59; Robert
W. Wood & Dominic L. Daher, Contingent Attorney's Fees in Class Action Cases - From Bad
to Worse for Taxpayer-Plaintiffs, 99 J. TAX'N 228 (2003).
32. See Robert W. Wood, More Confusion on Tax Treatment of Attorneys' Fees: Whose
Law Applies?, BNA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT, May 21, 2002, at 701.
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from the general rule announced in Banks. Yet, so far, the limited
post-Banks case law suggests that taxpayers may have a rough
time with these arguments.
II. THE JOBS ACT
The Jobs Act, signed by President Bush on October 22, 2004,
allows an above-the-line deduction for amounts attributable to at-
torneys' fees and costs received by individuals based on claims
brought under the False Claims Act,33 section 1862(b)(3)(A) of the
Social Security Act,34 or unlawful discrimination claims.35 The
law identifies the types of qualifying "unlawful discrimination" by
referencing a long list of laws that provide for employment claims.
Specifically enumerated, these laws are as follows:
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991;36
2. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995;
3 7
3. National Labor Relations Act;
3 8
4. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938;
3 9
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;40
6. Rehabilitation Act of 1973;41
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974;42
8. Education Amendments of 1972;
4 3
9. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988;
4 4
10. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act;4 5
11. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993;46
12. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-34 (2000) (relating to employment rights of
uniformed service personnel);
13. Civil Rights Act of 1991;
4 7
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964;48
33. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3721-33 (2000).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (2000).
35. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1546-47 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 302, 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16b (2000)).
37. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 §§ 201-07, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1311-17 (2000).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
39. Id. §§ 201-19.
40. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §§ 4, 15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 633a
(2000).
41. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §§ 501, 504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2000).
42. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
43. Education Amendments of 1972 tit. 9, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2000).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-9 (2000).
45. Id. §§ 2102-9.
46. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2000).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 1977, 1979, 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (2000).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703, 704, 717, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-3, e-16 (2000).
6
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15. Fair Housing Act;4 9
16. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990;50
17. any provision of federal law prohibiting the discharge of an em-
ployee, discrimination against an employee, or any other form of
retaliation or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights
or taking other actions permitted under federal law (known as
whistleblower protection provisions);5 1 or
18. any provision of federal, state or local law, or common law
claims permitted under federal, state or local law, that provides
for the enforcement of civil rights, or regulates any aspect of the
employment relationship, including claims for wages, compen-
sation, or benefits, or prohibiting the discharge of an employee,
discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retali-
ation or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or tak-
ing other actions permitted by law.52
The list is noteworthy in that it covers two basic groups: (1) Fed-
eral False Claims Act claims and (2) employment claims.
A. False Claims Act
False Claims Act cases are generally brought to expose fraud
and to recover monies for the federal government. Under the
False Claims Act, a whistleblower who uncovers fraud serves in
the capacity of a private attorney general, and on the successful
prosecution of the case is entitled to a relator's share. 53 The gov-
ernment may or may not choose to intervene in the case. Litiga-
tion is often protracted, and attorneys' fees and costs tend to be
very high. The latter fact exacerbates the already difficult attor-
neys' fee deductibility problem.
Many states have their own versions of the False Claims Act
to recover monies for their state. 54 Although the Jobs Act applies
to Federal False Claims Act cases, claims brought under state
counterpart legislation are not entitled to an above-the-line deduc-
tion for attorneys' fees under the Jobs Act. 55 Congress has
granted relief for the attorney fee problem in the employment liti-
gation context and for Federal False Claims Act cases, but relators
49. Fair Housing Act §§ 804, 805, 806, 808, 818, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, 3606, 3608,
3617 (2000).
50. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 102, 202, 302, 503, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112,
12132, 12182, 12203 (2000).
51. I.R.C. § 62(e)(17) (West 2005).
52. Id. § 62(e)(18).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000).
54. See, e.g., False Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (West 2005).
55. The Jobs Act's exhaustive list does not include claims brought under state false
claims acts.
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in cases brought under state counterparts to the False Claims Act
get no relief. This omission suggests that there is a premium on
form, instead of substance, and results in different tax treatment
of similar claims.
B. Employment Nexus
The Jobs Act's list of sixteen federal statutes that entitle
plaintiffs to an above-the-line deduction for their attorneys' fees
are all related to employment. 56 Also included on the list of those
entitled to protection are whistleblower provisions which cover
provisions of federal law (thus omitting state whistleblower pro-
tections) that prohibit the discharge of (or discrimination or repri-
sal against) an employee for being a whistleblower. 57 There is a
catchall category, but it also applies only to employment cases. 58
Most whistleblowers are employees or former employees who have
access to information. A Federal False Claims Act case, or state
counterpart, in which the relator is seeking a recovery for the gov-
ernment (with a share to the relator) might also involve a claim
under a whistleblower protection statute, but that would gener-
ally be a separate action.
In this age of increasing legal specialization, a whistleblower
may use one law firm to bring a False Claims Act action and an-
other law firm to bring an employment action. For example, such
a situation would arise where the employee/whistleblower is fired
and discriminated against on the job. Suppose a whistleblower re-
ceives (1) a $300,000 recovery in the employment action that is
protected from double taxation of attorneys' fees under the Jobs
Act, and (2) a $3 million relator's share under a state counterpart
to the False Claims Act. The latter is not covered by the Jobs Act,
and thus is presumptively subject to the general rule expressed by
the Court in Banks.
C. Scope of the "Catchall"
The final "catchall" at the bottom of the list of provisions,
which allows for specific above-the-line deductions, expressly enti-
56. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1546 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)); see sources cited supra notes
36-50.
57. I.R.C. § 62(e)(17) (West 2005).
58. Id. § 62(e)(18).
Vol. 67
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tles attorney fee relief in Federal False Claims Act cases. 59 State
false claims cases are not mentioned and presumably not entitled
to relief. Indeed, after the litany of specific statutes that are all
employment related, the catchall basket appears to embrace em-
ployment cases only, and would seem not to bring other things
within it. Although it does scoop up state and local laws, and even
common law claims made under federal, state or local law, it is
hard to imagine the catchall applying to non-employment claims.
D. Other Causes of Action
Various other claims also do not appear to be within the
catchall, such as defamation claims. If a taxpayer is defamed and
successfully brings an action through a contingent-fee lawyer, the
general rule of Banks will presumptively apply, and the taxpayer
will suffer the same kind of attorney fee problems which taxpay-
ers have dealt with for years. The Jobs Act plainly suggests that
defamation claims are less deserving of protection against tax in-
equity than employment claims. Defamation, a tort under the
common law, is not entitled to an above-the-line deduction for at-
torneys' fees unless it occurs in the context of employment. 60 The
Jobs Act thus supplies one tax rule if a taxpayer is defamed
outside of his employment, and quite another tax rule if he is de-
famed, for example, by his employer.
It is arguable that a defamation claim, whether based inside
or outside the employment relationship, is never an employment
claim. However, it seems likely that a defamation claim against
an employer would arise only in the context of other employment-
based claims, such as some type of discrimination, harassment or
wrongful termination. It remains to be seen whether the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) will attempt to bifurcate recoveries into
employment and non-employment claims, seeking to limit the
above-the-line deduction to only those attorneys' fees related to
the employment claims. Thus far, the IRS has given no guidance
on this point.
How this issue will be resolved may be very fact-based. A
case that seems predominantly employment-based may be decided
one way, while a case brought predominantly as a tort case, but
with ancillary employment claims, might be resolved in another
way. If this does occur, it may put a premium on planning around
59. Id.
60. See Wood, supra note 29, at 962.
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such a result. Although there have always been good reasons to
include specific tax allocation language in settlement agreements,
there may be yet another reason to be specific. Unlike the Code's
pre-1996 version of section 104,61 which favored tort recoveries
over employment recoveries, this new tax incentive-based plan-
ning would favor allocations to employment claims (with a corol-
lary allocation to related attorneys' fees) rather than tort claims.
Such dramatically contrary incentives turn logic, or at least tradi-
tional practice, on its head and are likely to catch some taxpayers
and advisors unaware.
Similarly, if a false imprisonment case occurs in the context of
employment, an above-the-line deduction for attorneys' fees could
apply. Conversely, if the false imprisonment occurs outside of
that context, presumably no above-the-line deduction would be
available. Thus, if an employer locks an employee in his office,
perhaps the employee can deduct his attorneys' fees above the
line. Conversely, if the police lock him up in error, he cannot
claim an above-the-line deduction for his attorneys' fees and
therefore may pay more taxes on his eventual recovery.
Despite the lack of guidance from the IRS or Treasury De-
partment, there is still interplay between attorneys' fees issues
and section 104, which excludes personal physical injuries and
sickness damages.62 If a taxpayer actually suffers physical inju-
ries while being falsely imprisoned, he may be able to obviate
some or all of the attorney fee problem by claiming a section 104
exclusion. However, section 104 is also controversial with the IRS.
The IRS has given very little guidance on the scope of section 104
as amended in 1996.63 We still do not know precisely how serious
something must be before it is considered a physical injury, al-
though it appears the IRS wants to see bruises or other outward
evidence before it places a halo of excludability on the injured
plaintiff.6 4
The Jobs Act above-the-line deduction plainly does not apply
to causes of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 65 Although emotional distress claims are often
brought in the employment context, they are also often brought
61. I.R.C. § 104 (West 1994) (amended 1996).
62. Id.
63. See Robert W. Wood, Post-1996 Act Section 104 Cases: Where Are We Eight Years
Later?, 105 TAx NOTES 68, 68 (2004).
64. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000).
65. See Wood, supra note 29, at 962.
Vol. 67
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outside of this sphere. As with defamation, emotional distress
claims will apparently receive one tax treatment if they occur in
the employment context, and decidedly less favorable treatment if
they do not. Of course, it could be argued that ancillary emotional
distress claims made in the context of an employment action
would not be entitled to relief. The IRS could seek to allocate at-
torneys' fees between various claims. If the IRS attempts to allo-
cate attorneys' fees between the claims, the administrative
problems are likely to be enormous.
Invasion of privacy claims seem likely to suffer from the same
dichotomy. Causes of action for interference with contractual re-
lations and/or breach of contract would also appear to be treated
differently inside, versus outside, the employment context.
Claims for investment losses may also be affected. If a broker has
made bad investment decisions on your behalf and you recover
from him, you may have trouble deducting your attorneys' fees.
Conversely, if your employer makes the bad investment decisions
for you, and the investment claim is made in the context of your
employment litigation, presumably you can deduct the attorneys'
fees above-the-line.
E. Noncovered Employment Cases
Despite the apparent completeness of the catchall list in re-
gard to employment cases, some employment lawyers bring em-
ployment claims that are not true discrimination cases. In fact,
lawyers may be concerned that some of their cases will not fall
within the group of enumerated claims, even given the long list
and its catchall.
For example, this could be true with some Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) claims. ERISA applies to pen-
sion and welfare benefit cases, and preempts state law.66 The
Jobs Act enumerates ERISA cases as one of the categories entitled
to an above-the-line deduction, yet it refers only to cases under
section 510 of ERISA.67 That section deals with discrimination
claims and accounts for only a small fraction of successful ERISA
claims. Some employment lawyers assert that a section 510 claim
is nearly impossible to pursue effectively. A more typical ERISA
claim is for benefits, such as pension or long-term disability bene-
fits. This reality makes one wonder whether these other ERISA
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2005).
67. I.R.C. § 62(e)(7).
11
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claims are entitled to the above-the-line deduction under the
catchall basket.
Furthermore, overtime pay claims are generally not regarded
as discrimination claims. At the same time, the Jobs Act suggests
that any unlawful act that is pursued under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) should give rise to an above-the-line deduction
for attorneys' fees.68 Yet, if the IRS interprets the term "discrimi-
nation" narrowly, perhaps only true discrimination claims under
FLSA, such as retaliation claims and Equal Pay Act claims, would
qualify. It is arguable that the catchall provision would bring
many cases under its protection, including overtime, minimum
wage, and benefit cases. However, this assumption is far from
certain.
F. Punitive Damages
Since the enactment of the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996 (1996 Act), punitive damages are clearly taxable.69 This
clarification came after decades of confusion about the tax treat-
ment of punitive damages. The IRS has done nothing to address
that ambiguity, and there remains no definition of "punitive dam-
ages" in the Code or Regulations. 70 Furthermore, many states
now require that in a civil action in which punitive damages are
paid to a private party, the state is entitled to a share.71
For example, suppose a taxpayer receives a punitive damage
award for willful defamation in California. Assume the taxpayer
recovers $1 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive dam-
ages. Under California law, 75% of that punitive damage award
(or $750,000) goes to the State of California. 72 The taxpayer
would receive the remaining 25%. There are several possible
68. Id. § 62(e)(4).
69. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1(a), 110 Stat.
1755 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 26 (West 2005)); see, e.g., O'Gilvie v. United
States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
70. See Robert W. Wood, Will Courts Import Punitive Characterization, TAX NOTES
1200, 1200 (1997); Robert W. Wood, Proposed Nondeductibility for Punitive Damages: Will
it Work?, 100 TAx NOTES 99, 99 (2003).
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5 (2005). Note, however, that this provision will
automatically be repealed on July 1, 2006. Other states which have enacted similar puni-
tive damage taking statutes include Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Oregon. See
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2005); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (2005); IND. CODE § 34-
51-3-6(b)(2) (2005); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (2005); OR. REv. STAT. § 31.735 (2005).
72. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294.5(b)(1) (2005).
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ways in which this distribution could be taxed, particularly when
contingent attorneys' fees are involved.
In 2003, when the Senate version of what became the Jobs
Act was being considered, Senator Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, tried to
address the increasing popularity of laws allowing for punitive
damages to be split. Senator Hatch introduced an amendment to
the Senate bill to address punitive damage awards.73 The amend-
ment correctly indicated that even though punitive damages are
always taxable to the recipient, punitive damages that must be
paid to a state under a split-award statute would be excluded from
taxable income.7 4
The second portion of the Hatch amendment said that in such
a case, any attorneys' fees or other costs incurred by the taxpayer
in connection with obtaining an award of punitive damages would
also not be taxable.75 Unfortunately, the Hatch amendment was
not included in the Jobs Act. It is unclear whether the amend-
ment, having been proposed and not adopted, suggests anything
about how this provision of the tax law will be interpreted when
the IRS or the courts are faced with this punitive damage awards
question.
G. Prospective Relief
The effective date of the Jobs Act is controversial, as its attor-
neys' fee provision is prospective only. The amendments apply
only to fees and costs paid after the date of enactment (October 22,
2004), with respect to any judgment or settlement occurring after
that date. 76 Thus, the fees and costs must be paid after October
22, 2004, and they must be paid thereafter on a settlement or
judgment that occurs after that date. 77
Although the Jobs Act plainly states that it applies only pro-
spectively, a Senate floor debate suggests that the Senate (or at
least Senators Baucus and Grassley) believed that the Jobs Act
provision merely reaffirmed then existing law (from the taxpayer-
favored circuits) on the tax treatment of attorneys' fees.78 The
73. S. Amend. 627 to S. 1054, 108th Cong. (2003).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703(b), 118 Stat. 1418,
1546 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62(e) (West 2005)).
77. Id.; see also, Wood, supra note 29, at 963.
78. 150 CONG. REC. S11, 036 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sens. Baucus &
Grassley).
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floor debate leading up to passage of the Jobs Act included the
following:
Mr. Baucus:
As I understand it, the case law with respect to the tax treat-
ment of attorney's fees paid by those that receive settlements or
judgments in connection with a claim of unlawful discrimination, a
False Claims Act, 'Qui Tam,' proceeding or similar actions is un-
clear and that its application was questionable as interpreted by the
IRS. Further, it was never the intent of Congress that the attor-
neys' fees portions of such recoveries should be included in taxable
income whether for regular income or alternative minimum tax pur-
poses.
It is the understanding of the chairman that it was the confer-
ees' intention for Section 703 [which provides an above-the-line de-
duction for attorneys' fees] to clarify the proper interpretation of the
prior law, and any settlements prior to the date of enactment should
be treated in a manner consistent with such intent?
Mr. Grassley: The Senator is correct. The conferees are acting to
make it clear that attorneys' fees and costs in these cases are not
taxable income, especially where the plaintiff, or in the case of a Qui
Tam proceeding, the relator, never actually receives the portion of
the award paid to the attorneys. Despite differing opinions by cer-
tain jurisdictions and the IRS, it is my opinion that this is the cor-
rect interpretation of the law prior to enactment of Section 703 as it
will be going forward. In adopting this provision, Congress is codi-
fying the fair and equitable policy that the tax treatment of settle-
ments or awards made after or prior to the effective date of this
provision should be the same. The courts and IRS should not treat
attorneys' fees and other costs as taxable income.
As I stated in my May 12, 2004 press release summarizing this
and other provisions passed by the Senate as part of S. 1637[:]
"Tax relief gets the headlines, but part of tax relief is tax fair-
ness. It's clearly a fairness issue to make sure people don't have to
pay income taxes on income that was never theirs in the first place.
That's common sense."
Section 703 will help in well known cases, such as that of
Cynthia Spina, an Illinois police officer that secured a settlement in
a sexual discrimination case that left her owing $10,000 or more.
There are literally dozens of others like her in similar situations
and it is my strong belief that the courts and the IRS should apply
the guidelines of Section 703 not only after the date of enactment
but also to settlements put in place prior to that time.79
79. Id. (citing Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Grassley Praises Senate Passage of IRS
Whistleblower Help, Civil Rights Tax Reform, Charitable Giving Reform, Ban on Deduc-
tion of Government Fines, "Son of Boss" Item (May 12, 2004), http://grassley.senate.gov/
releases/2004p04r05-12a.htm).
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Of course, it can be argued that this floor debate is not per-
suasive in light of an express effective date in the Jobs Act itself.
Moreover, the Court's Banks decision, in which the Court stated
that the Jobs Act was prospective only (without mentioning the
floor debate)80 is another point against the relevancy of this dis-
cussion.8 ' Nevertheless, it seems likely that this point will be
raised by taxpayers in litigation where the effective date of the
Jobs Act is important. It will be interesting to see if, when, and
how this debate will be raised in the future.
On a more fundamental level, the Jobs Act provision itself
raises legitimate questions as to how one determines what settle-
ments or judgments are covered. Settlements are straightfor-
ward. Both the execution of the settlement agreement and the
payment of the money must occur after October 22, 2004, to qual-
ify for the above-the-line deduction.8 2 Judgments, however, are
not so simple. Some judgments predating the enactment of the
Jobs Act may be on appeal and are only currently being resolved.
Consider the following example:
Taxpayer A brings suit for employment discrimination and recovers
a verdict of $800,000 in 2003. Judgment is entered, but the defen-
dant appeals. The Court of Appeals affirms in January of 2006. On
February 15, 2006, the date for a petition for rehearing to the state
Court expires, and the defendant prepares to pay the judgment.
In this situation, when the defendant pays the judgment, is the
plaintiff entitled to an above-the-line deduction provided by the
Jobs Act? The Jobs Act's amendment to section 62 (allowing an
above-the-line deduction for attorneys' fees) specifically states
that the new law applies to "fees and costs paid after the date of
the enactment of this Act with respect to any judgment or settle-
ment occurring after such date."83 The triggering event here is
when the judgment can be said to "occur."
H. When Does a Judgment Occur?
No ready answer exists in the statute or its legislative history
to the question of when a judgment "occurs." Presumably, this
seemingly simple "occur" language refers to something more basic
80. Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433 (2005).
81. In the oral arguments for Banks, Justice Scalia commented, wondering who wrote
the colloquy between Senators Baucus and Grassley. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30,
Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No. 03-907), available at http://www.supremecour-
tus.gov/oral-argument-transcripts/03-892.pdf.
82. American Jobs Creation Act § 703.
83. Id. § 62.
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than the time at which a judgment is entered, or the time at which
a judgment becomes final. The entry of judgment has a legal
meaning and can be ascertained with accuracy. The same can be
said for the time at which a judgment becomes final.
Similar effective date provisions in other tax law changes
have been more clear-cut. For example, when the 1996 Act added
the physical modifier to section 104, it did so for all amounts re-
ceived after the date of enactment (August 20, 1996), except for
amounts received under a written binding agreement, court de-
cree or mediation award in effect on, or issued on or before, Sep-
tember 13, 1995.84
The time at which a judgment "occurs," on the other hand, is
not precise, though some clarification on this topic exists. For ex-
ample, in the context of the priority of a federal tax lien, a judg-
ment "occurs" when it is first rendered by the court.8 5 In United
States v. Dishman Independent Oil, Inc.,8 6 the court of appeals re-
viewed the procedural history of the litigation, finding that the
judgment occurred when the bankruptcy court first entered its fi-
nal decision, notwithstanding an appeal to the federal district
court and ultimately to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
stated:
Dishman was granted judgment by the bankruptcy court on April
27, 1992. The IRS tax lien seeks to collect $2,851,910.09, which is
owed to the United States by the debtors for unpaid taxes from the
third quarter of 1987 through the third quarter of 1988. On May 29,
1992, the IRS was permitted to intervene in the proceeding to seek a
determination by the court that its federal tax lien was valid and
prior to any interest held by Dishman in the debtors' property. The
IRS eventually filed a motion for summary judgment which the
bankruptcy court denied. Dishman then filed its own motion for
summary judgment against the IRS. The bankruptcy court granted
Dishman's motion for summary judgment, after finding that Dish-
man's attachment lien was perfected by the judgment entered in its
favor on April 27, 1992, and was therefore prior to the federal tax
lien against the debtors. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's order granting Dishman's motion for summary judgment.8 7
84. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
85. See In re Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Trical Mfg. Co., 523 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1957).
86. 46 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1995).
87. Id. (citation omitted).
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The IRS appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit, where the
court recognized the taxpayer's judgment occurred on April 27,
1992, notwithstanding the appeals.88 The court stated:
We believe this issue is controlled by the holding of United States v.
Acri, which supports the IRS's position. In Acri, the Supreme Court
unequivocally held that a federal tax lien filed after an attachment
lien was executed had priority over the attachment lien because
judgment on the attachment lien did not occur until after the filing
of the tax lien. In Acri, the Court was not persuaded by the recogni-
tion of the attachment lien as perfected under Ohio law. Rather, for
"federal tax purposes" the lien was "inchoate . . .because, at the
time the attachment issued, the fact and the amount of the lien
were contingent upon the outcome of the suit for damages."8 9
These lien authorities may not be expressly directed at the
question of when a judgment occurs for purposes of section 62.
Nevertheless, these authorities do appear to support the view that
a judgment "occurs" when it is first rendered. They also suggest
that the IRS would probably interpret the term "occur" in a gen-
eral way, rather than by reference to some technical lapsing of
appeal period, or to a judgment otherwise becoming final. There
may well be other areas of the body of federal tax law where this
kind of spadework should also be done.
The rudimentary formulation of the Jobs Act's effective date,
with its simplistic concept of the occurrence of a judgment as a
trigger for the effective date of this important provision, may pre-
clude the application of an above-the-line deduction in many
cases. However, it should often be possible to enter into a settle-
ment agreement to make the timing of the judgment irrelevant. If
a judgment would otherwise not be covered by the above-the-line
deduction because it occurred prior to October 23, 2004, a settle-
ment of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant after October
22, 2004, should import the above-the-line deduction. A binding
settlement agreement dated after October 22, 2004, would serve
as the vehicle for the payment, not the judgment. As long as there
is some procedural possibility for keeping the case alive - a writ,
an appeal, a proceeding to attempt to set aside the judgment - a
settlement should be effective.
Indeed, the plaintiff who needs a settlement for tax purposes
may be willing to give up some of the consideration that would be
paid via the judgment. Alternatively, the plaintiff may be willing
to make other concessions such as agreeing to confidentiality obli-
88. Id. at 527.
89. Id, (citing 348 U.S. 211, 214 (1955)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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gations or other non-monetary items. Given the procedural wran-
gling and delays that are often encountered in enforcing a judg-
ment, a consensual resolution would seem appropriate. A settle-
ment should not be regarded as a sham if any material term in the
settlement differs from those set forth in the judgment.
There may conceivably be cases in which the defendant in-
sists on paying the judgment and not settling a case. There may
also occasionally be defendants who are willing to settle, but who
insist on extracting a hefty price for their cooperation, perhaps
seeking to split what they perceive as the pertinent tax benefits.
However, in the vast majority of cases, a settlement should be pos-
sible. Hopefully such settlements will secure the plaintiffs above-
the-line deduction.
I. Allocating Among Claims
The fact that the Jobs Act differentiates some claims from
others may prompt taxpayers to attempt to categorize their claims
within the list of "good" attorney fees, which are those paid or in-
curred to pursue Federal False Claims Act cases and employment
discrimination claims. The vast majority of lawsuits have multi-
ple causes of action and a mixture of factual details. For example,
a plaintiff might bring a lawsuit with one claim for employment
discrimination and other claims including defamation arising out
of employment. Will the IRS try to allocate the attorneys' fees?
Will it be like the situation so often occurring in the context of
divorce, where attorneys commonly allocate their fees between
regular divorce legal fees and tax legal fees, the latter being de-
ductible?
III. BANKS
Although the Jobs Act has brought tremendous statutory
change to this area, the Court brought about judicial change al-
most simultaneously. The Court's decision in Banks attempted to
resolve the bitter split raging in the circuit courts. 90 Banks re-
viewed holdings where attorneys' liens were held to have been
strong enough that the attorneys themselves owned the fees, and
the gross income was not considered to pass through the clients'
hands. 91 In the lower courts, the respondents in Banks had been
90. 543 U.S. 426, 429-30 (2005).
91. Id. at 429.
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allowed to report only their net income, after attorneys' fees.92 Al-
though the Court had five times refused to hear a case on attor-
neys' fees where the taxpayer had lost,93 in Banks it was the IRS
who had lost in the lower courts and ultimately asked the Court to
intervene.94
Oral argument in Banks was scheduled for November 1, 2004,
a little over a week after the enactment of the Jobs Act.95 Approx-
imately one week before the oral argument was scheduled, the
taxpayers in Banks asked the Court not to decide the case, argu-
ing in a supplemental brief that the Jobs Act had mooted their
case.96 Underlying this request was the assumption that taxpay-
ers would be better off at least knowing that the law in some cir-
cuits was favorable on the attorneys' fee point, rather than having
the door shut entirely. It was a prescient filing by the taxpayers,
one that the Court did not heed.
The Court rendered its decision on January 24, 2005. 9 7 The
actual holding is succinct, though much of the Court's opinion is
not. The holding bears quoting, particularly since there is much
speculation about what this opinion does and does not do. The
Court held that, "as a general rule, when a litigant's recovery con-
stitutes income, the litigant's income includes the portion of the
recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee."9 8
On first glance, more than a few taxpayers will be comforted
by the fact that the Court announced this concept "as a general
rule," thus implicitly endorsing the notion that there will be ex-
ceptions. The opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, 99 and all
members of the Court agreed except Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
did not take part in the decision. 100 The lack of dissent, and dis-
92. Id. at 431-32 (citing Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
541 U.S. 958 (2004); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542
U.S. 958 (2004)).
93. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972
(2001); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1112 (2001); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904
(2002); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056
(2002); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1964).
94. Banks, 543 U.S. at 426.
95. Id.; American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1547 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)).
96. Joint Supplemental Brief for Respondents, Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (Nos. 03-
892, 03-907).
97. Banks, 543 U.S. at 426.
98. Id. at 430.
99. Id. at 428.
100. Id. at 426, 439.
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cernable lack of compassion for taxpayers in the opinion, seems
surprising. It is particularly odd because some Justices in oral ar-
gument expressed concern about the possibility of confiscatory
taxation. Justice O'Connor made more than a passing point about
this during oral argument, saying the tax on attorneys' fees might
even raise Constitutional questions.10 1 Justice Breyer made a
similar suggestion. 10 2
After stating the holding "as a general rule," the Court recited
the facts, explained the problem of deducting legal fees as a mis-
cellaneous itemized expense, and then noted that Congress had
prospectively addressed the problem for many cases (and in par-
ticular, for cases arising in the employment context).10 3 The
Court noted, though, that the Jobs Act is not retroactive, so the
taxpayers in Banks still needed a decision.10 4 As noted above, it
could be argued that the Senate floor colloquy between Senators
Grassley and Baucus is support for the argument that the Jobs
Act is retroactive and merely enunciates current law.' 0 5 It is not
clear whether the Court's explicit notation that the Jobs Act is not
retroactive was meant to squelch this argument. Of course, the
Jobs Act itself notes that its application is prospective only.' 0 6
In large part, the Court adopted the assignment of income
cases, referring to such hoary cases as Helvering v. Horst10 7 and
Lucas v. Earl.10 8 With strident language, the Court addressed the
theory that the attorney-client relationship can be viewed as a
kind of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes.10 9
Giving it short shrift, the Court rejected this partnership sugges-
tion, dismissing it with one sentence." 0 The Court then talked
about the lawyer as an agent, and cited liberally from the Restate-
ment of Agency."'
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No. 03-907), availa-
ble at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-argument-transcripts/03-892.pdf.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430-33.
104. Id. at 433.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
106. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1546-48 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)).
107. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
108. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
109. Banks, 543 U.S. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, Comment e
(1957)).
110. Id. (stating "[wie further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relation-
ship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes").
111. Id. at 436-37 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13, 39, 387 (1957)).
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Citing favorably from Judge Posner's stinging opinion in Ken-
seth v. Commissioner,112 the Court dispensed with the notion that
state law might confer special benefits on attorneys which could
influence ownership and, therefore, taxation. Instead, the Court
concluded that lawyers are mere agents, and again cited liberally
from the Restatement of Agency. 113 The Court seemed to hold up
the possibility that state law might make a difference, stating
"[tihis rule applies whether or not the attorney-client contract or
state law confers any special rights or protections on the attorney,
so long as these protections do not alter the fundamental princi-
pal-agent character of the relationship."1 4 Although the Court
noted that state law varies on the strength of attorneys' security
interests in a contingent fee, the Court said no state laws of which
the Court was aware actually "convert the attorney from an agent
to a partner."1 15
This finding suggests that the Court does not, and perhaps
can not, comment on all state laws. The recent enactment of a
Washington attorneys' lien law, which appears to be far stronger
than any of the state laws considered by the Court, could be rele-
vant and was not examined by the Court.' 16
The Court noted that the taxpayers proposed various theories
that would exclude attorneys' fees from gross income, or permit
deductibility.1 1 7 The Court referred to these as "novel proposi-
tions," stating the arguments were not advanced in the earlier
stages of the litigation, and therefore were not examined by the
courts of appeal.1 "" Therefore, the Court "decline[d] comment on
these supplementary theories," which were as follows:
* the contingent fee agreement established a Subchapter K
partnership;
* litigation recoveries were proceeds from the disposition of
property, so that the attorneys' fees must be subtracted as
a capital expense from the proceeds; and
112. Id. at 436-37 (citing Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) which
states "the contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of his client's claim in the legal sense
any more than the commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer's accounts receiv-
able").
113. Id. at 436.
114. Id.
115. Banks, 543 U.S. at 436.
116. See WAsH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010 (2005). For discussion of the Washington law, see
Robert W. Wood, Washington's Attorneys' Lien Law, THE TAX ADVISER, Dec. 2004, at 729.
117. Banks, 543 U.S. at 437.
118. Id. at 438.
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* the fees are deductible reimbursed employee business ex-
penses. 119
Noting that it would not consider any of these arguments (and
this is apparently a nonexclusive list of what the Court would not
consider), the Court also said it did not reach the fact pattern
where a relator pursues a claim on behalf of the United States
under the Federal False Claims Act. 120 Although False Claims
Act cases are covered prospectively by the Jobs Act, prior False
Claims Act cases are not impacted by the Banks opinion. 12'
Finally, as if these carveouts were not enough, the Court ad-
dressed statutory fee shifting provisions, as well as injunctive re-
lief.122 The Court noted that Mr. Banks argued that assignment
of income principles would be inconsistent with the purpose of
statutory fee shifting provisions. 23 Statutory fees may be availa-
ble to a plaintiffs lawyer under either state or federal law, the
idea being that fee shifting, which enables a defendant to bear the
plaintiffs attorney's fees, is important to encourage proper compli-
ance with the law. Taxpayers have often argued that the assign-
ment of income analysis frequently applied by the IRS and the
courts ought to have no bearing in a fee shifting case, since a fee
shifting statute makes the argument for lawyer ownership of the
fees considerably stronger. 124
Indeed, it seems hard to argue in such a case that the client is
"paying" the plaintiffs lawyers anything, since the court is award-
ing damages. Taxpayers have sometimes taken comfort from
cases such as Flannery v. Prentice, 25 a California decision involv-
ing whether a statutory fee award is really the property of the
client or the lawyer. Taxation, after all, ought to be about who is
entitled to the income. The question in Flannery was whether the
attorneys or client were entitled to fees awarded under the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act. 126 Although not a tax
case, the Flannery court rejected Sinyard v. Commissioner127 and
119. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 438.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 438-39.
123. Banks, 543 U.S. at 438.
124. See id. at 437-38; Allum v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (2005), 2005 WL 1692488,
at *9 (TC. July 20, 2005).
125. 28 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2001).
126. Id. at 862 (citing CAL. GOVT CODE § 12965 (West 2001)).
127. Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that attorneys' fees are
taxable to the taxpayer). When Flannery was decided, Sinyard was the controlling case in
the Ninth Circuit regarding attorneys' fees.
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found that, absent proof of an enforceable agreement to the con-
trary, the attorneys' fees belonged "to the attorneys who labored to
earn them. 1 28
Quite significantly, in Banks, the Court glossed over the fee
shifting issue. The Court noted:
After Banks settled his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calcu-
lated solely on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract.
There was no court-ordered fee award [to Banks' attorney], nor was
there any indication in Banks' contract with his attorney, or in the
settlement agreement with the defendant, that the contingent fee
paid to Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees that Banks
might otherwise have been entitled to recover. 129
All of these explanations are quite important. The Court sug-
gested that the result in Banks might well have been different if
there had been a court-ordered fee award. 130 The Court also sug-
gested that the result might have been different if there were any
indication in Banks's contract with his lawyer that the contingent
fees were in lieu of statutory fees. Finally, the Court suggested
that the result might have been different if there were a state-
ment in the settlement agreement to this effect. 131
Any of these suggested differences may have changed the out-
come of Banks. However, it may have been necessary for all of
these facts to be present (a court ordered fee award, plus a provi-
sion in the contingent fee agreement obviating a percentage fee
when there is a court awarded fee, plus a statement in the settle-
ment agreement that the plaintiffs lawyer is receiving a statutory
fee) for Banks to have come out differently.
Unfortunately for taxpayers, despite the Court's positive lan-
guage in Banks, at least one case in the Tax Court has already
given short shrift to the argument that a statutory-fee-based
claim would make a difference. In Vincent v. Commissioner,1 32 de-
cided after Banks, the Tax Court ruled that an award of attorneys'
fees pursuant to a California fee shifting statute was not excluda-
ble from the taxpayer's gross income. The court noted that Ninth
Circuit law governs any appeal of the Vincent Tax Court case, and
citing Sinyard, notwithstanding a statutory fee claim.1 33
128. Flannery, 28 P.3d at 862.
129. Banks, 543 U.S. at 439.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119, - (2005), 2005 WL 1022953, at *6 (T.C. May 3, 2005).
133. Id. at *7 (citing Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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Perhaps more significantly, the Tax Court stated in a footnote
that:
Petitioner's reliance on Flannery v. Prentice is misplaced. We are
not bound by State law classifications as to the ownership of income.
Any contingent attorney's fees paid by petitioner on account of her
(taxable) civil settlement would properly be income under Commis-
sioner v. Banks, supra, and she may not escape this outcome by ar-
guing that, because her attorney's fees and costs were awarded by a
civil court pursuant to a statutory fee shifting provision, the income
is properly attributable to her attorney. We are not presented with,
and do not decide, whether petitioner would have been taxed on the
attorney's fees paid to her attorney, had she been represented by a
nonprofit legal foundation. 1 34
The last point the Court did not address in Banks is the situa-
tion prevailing where there is injunctive relief. Although related
to the fee shifting point, it is distinct. Banks argued that in some
cases, such as where the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief,
where the statute caps the dollar amount of a plaintiffs recovery,
or where for other reasons damages are substantially less than
attorneys' fees, court-awarded attorneys' fees can actually exceed
a plaintiffs monetary recovery. 135 Banks also argued that treat-
ing the fee award as income to the plaintiff in such cases can lead
to the perverse result where the plaintiff loses money by winning
the suit. 136 The Court held that it need not address such
claims.137
IV. QUESTIONS REMAINING FOLLOWING BANKs
A. Class Actions
The tax treatment of attorneys' fees in class actions has long
been confusing. The authorities have often drawn distinctions be-
tween opt-in and opt-out classes, with opt-in plaintiffs being more
likely to be treated as receiving attorneys' fees for tax purposes.
Tax authorities have even drawn distinctions between those class
members who sign, versus those who do not sign, a fee agreement
with class counsel. Such distinctions often do not seem to make
sense.' 38 Because of the nature of class actions, attorneys' fees
134. Id. at *7 n.11 (citations omitted).
135. Banks, 543 U.S. at 438.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 438-39.
138. Robert W. Wood & Dominic L. Daher, Class Action Attorney Fees: Even Bigger Tax
Problems?, 101 TAx NOTES 507, 507 (2003).
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and costs can be especially high, with Spina-like results. 139 Un-
fortunately, the Banks case, with its side-stepping of the statutory
fee issue, does not help to clarify this confusion.
B. Insurance Industry
Banks has had a curious effect on the insurance industry.
The mere fact that it is an adverse decision on the attorneys' fees
issue may prompt some plaintiffs to structure fees they otherwise
would not. There is a growing trend of structured settlements
outside the personal injury field. 140 A nonqualified structure,
with its deferral of tax consequences, can ameliorate the AMT
problems caused by attorneys' fees.
For some piaintiffs, Banks means that contingent attorneys'
fees will continue to cause tax problems. For example, claims for
defamation, false imprisonment, intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and insurance bad faith will still give rise to
attorneys' fee AMT problems. Any case with punitive damages,
even true personal physical injury cases, can raise this problem,
too.
Even employment claims that resulted in verdicts prior to Oc-
tober 23, 2004, may still be caught by this problem when they are
resolved on appeal, since the effective date of the Jobs Act provi-
sion covers judgments "occurring" after October 22, 2004.141 Suc-
cessful litigants whose cases are on appeal will have a strong in-
centive to "settle" the case, since settlements, unlike having the
verdict affirmed on appeal, should bring the case within the Jobs
Act provision.
Structures of attorneys' fees themselves may become more
popular after Banks. Some insurance companies have accom-
plished attorneys' fee structures with a section 130 qualified as-
signment. 42 Such companies have taken the view that in a true
personal physical injury case, the lawyers' portion of the recovery
139. See Liptak, supra note 26 (discussing Spina v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook
County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
140. Robert W. Wood, Structured Settlements in Non-Physical-Injury Cases: Tax Risks?,
104 TAx NOTES 511, 511 (2004).
141. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1548 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)); Banks, 543 U.S. at 433 ("The
Act is not retroactive ... it does not pertain here").
142. See Robert Wood, Structuring Attorneys' Fees: What's All the Fuss?, 60 Washington
State Bar News 2 (Feb. 2006); I.R.C. § 130 (2000).
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can be structured because it too represents section 104 damages,
at least to the plaintiff.143
At least one insurance company, on the other hand, has shied
away from using a qualified assignment company, and used a non-
qualified assignment company. 144 Banks solidified the view that
damages (outside the statutory fee area) belong to the client, first
and foremost. This view may make insurance companies more
comfortable using qualified assignment companies for structured
settlements of attorneys' fees, leading to more structures of attor-
neys' fees, since the number of providers will grow.
A related point is that structures of attorneys' fees may get a
boost from the implications Banks has on section 72(u) of the
Code. 145 This section taxes the cash build-up in value of a life in-
surance policy in certain cases. 146 A notable exception is a "quali-
fied funding asset" as defined in section 130(d) of the Code. 147
This provision, therefore, favors qualified structured settlements
(within the meaning of sections 104 and 130) as opposed to un-
qualified (meaning taxable) ones. It has led at least one insurance
company to position its assignment company outside the United
States for creating nonqualified structures.1 48 The Banks decision
suggested that contingent attorneys' fees "generally" belong to the
client first, so that even the attorneys' portion of the award can be
structured with a domestic assignment company.149 The fact that
structures of attorneys' fees can be domestic in light of Banks sug-
gests that there may be more attorneys' fees structures in the fu-
ture.
C. Other Misconceptions
It is perhaps a sign of how widely the Court's decision was
anticipated that there was much confusion when it was handed
down. The Los Angeles Times initially reported that Banks meant
that all personal injury recoveries might be taxable. 50 This mis-
understanding was quickly pointed out to the Los Angeles Times,
143. See Wood, supra note 142; I.R.C. § 130 (2000); I.R.C. § 104 (2000).
144. Wood, supra note 140, at 511.
145. I.R.C. § 72(u) (2000).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 130(d).
148. Wood, supra note 140, at 511.
149. Banks v. Comm'r, 543 U.S. 426, 430 (2005).
150. David G. Savage, Lawsuit Winners Lose the Tax Battle, Los ANGELES TiMEs, Jan.
25, 2005, at A14.
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which in turn published a correction. 151 All this created considera-
bly more hubbub than one usually sees with a tax case.
D. Continuing Controversy
Perhaps practitioners were wrong to think that the Court, al-
ready materially aided by Congress's enactment of the Jobs Act,
would clear up the taxation of contingent attorneys' fees in a tidy
way. In fact, the Court's decision was underwhelming, though
perhaps its lack of precision and the several areas it declined to
consider will allow for some taxpayer planning.
There are some cases that are not resolved by the Jobs Act,
and also not resolved by the Banks opinion. First, False Claims
Act cases are expressly not covered by Banks. 52 False Claims Act
cases that predate the Jobs Act (or False Claims Act cases that are
resolved on appeal and the subject of a verdict relating back to a
date prior to October 23, 2004) are governed by old law.153 Since
there is no definitive case dealing with the tax implications of a
False Claims Act case, it would appear that the old circuit court
split controls.
At the same time, one could argue that a False Claims Act
case is fundamentally different from any other attorneys' fee situ-
ation. A relator in a False Claims Act case serves as a private
attorney general and is in the nature of a bounty hunter. 5 4 Such
an endeavor plainly sounds more like a trade or business than the
activity in a typical employment case. Therefore, one might argue
that a Schedule C treatment for the qui tam recovery would be the
appropriate tax treatment. On a Schedule C, of course, there
would be a natural netting of the attorneys' fees without running
afoul of the 2% itemized deduction threshold, phaseout or AMT.' 55
Secondly, another big area left open by Banks is the statutory
fees issue. The Court seemed to invite structures to avoid the
Banks result by noting that in Banks, there was no suggestion
that there was a court award of attorneys' fees, and no statement
as to the contingent fee award being obviated when there was a
statutory award in either the fee agreement or in the settlement
151. For the Record, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at A2.
152. Banks, 543 U.S. at 429-39.
153. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 703(b), 110 Stat.
1755 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 26 (West 2005)).
154. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000).
155. I.R.C. §§ 55, 67(a) (2000).
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agreement. 156 In many cases it would be fairly simple to add one
of these elements, and the Court suggested that it might make for
a better tax result.
Practitioners might consider adding a statement in a settle-
ment agreement that the lawyer is receiving his or her money di-
rectly from the defendant and in lieu of statutory fees that would
be awarded in the case had the case gone to trial. Alternatively,
or in addition, this could be addressed in the contingent fee agree-
ment between lawyer and client. Contingent fee agreements can
be amended, and it may be appropriate to amend or clarify a con-
tingent fee agreement before the case settles. Such an amend-
ment could presumably be made effective as of the date of the orig-
inal agreement. It is conceivable that such planning may avoid
the result reached in Banks.
Thirdly, another huge area left open by Banks is the situation
where there is injunctive relief. A taxpayer who is seeking injunc-
tive relief may end up with enormous attorneys' fees and a rela-
tively small net award.157 The fact that the Court in Banks
avoided this fact pattern suggests that perhaps a plaintiff can
avoid the Banks result in a case of this sort. Allocating attorneys'
fees between the injunctive relief and the cash compensation may
be one alternative. Mandating the direct payment of the attor-
neys' fees, providing the appropriate language in the settlement
agreement, and making sure that a Form 1099 goes directly (and
only) to the lawyers, may also help to obviate the general rule an-
nounced in Banks.
Fourthly, another open area concerns the theory that the law-
yer and client may be in partnership, thus dividing the gross in-
come between the client and attorney. Although the Court de-
voted one sentence to rejecting the partnership theory at the be-
ginning of the Banks opinion, it later said that it was not
considering the partnership theory at all.' 5 8 That leads one to
wonder whether partnership-like language in a contingent fee
agreement may be enough to avoid the general rule announced in
Banks. Attorneys may consider adding something like the follow-
ing to a fee agreement: "This agreement will be interpreted as a
partnership between lawyer and client to the maximum extent
permitted by law."
156. Banks, 543 U.S. at 434.
157. See Liptak, supra note 26 (discussing Spina v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook
County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
158. Banks, 543 U.S. at 437-38.
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Unfortunately, there is one Tax Court case post-Banks which
suggested that meeting the partnership theory may be difficult.
In Allum v. Commissioner, the plaintiff argued that taxation of
attorneys' fees was not dictated by Banks, and the Tax Court de-
manded items of proof. 159 Finding no evidence of any kind of part-
nership between Mr. Allum and his lawyer, the Tax Court found
that Banks controlled. 160 The Tax Court seemed to indicate that a
high standard will apply to partnership determinations, although
in Allum's case there was little to suggest a partnership. In fact,
Allum admitted he "hired" his lawyer. 161
It is unclear, of course, exactly how high a standard will ap-
ply. In Allum, the taxpayer had done nothing to support the argu-
ment that there was a partnership. Given the lack of evidence, it
does not seem surprising that the taxpayer's argument based on
the partnership theory failed. It remains to be seen whether more
significant compliance with partnership-like characteristics might
make a difference and might come within the exception to the gen-
eral rule of Banks.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal income tax treatment of attorneys' contingent fees
has had a tortured past. Its present has been populated by two
enormously significant legal developments, beginning with the
Jobs Act in 2004,162 and culminating in the Court's Banks decision
in early 2005.163 Unfortunately, both of these momentous devel-
opments have not resolved many of the legal questions that will
arise in future tax cases involving taxation of attorneys' fees.
Regrettably, although the Jobs Act eliminates attorneys' fee
tax problems from a significant class of cases (employment cases
and Federal False Claims Act cases), it plainly did not address the
vast population of other litigation claims.164 Because employment
cases posed the most obvious attorneys' fee problems, the mere
fact that Congress carved those cases out of the problem (allowing
them an above-the-line deduction) may actually have made mat-
159. Allum v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (2005), 2005 WL 1692488, at *9 (T.C. July
20, 2005).
160. Id. at *10.
161. Id. at *4.
162. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1548 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62 (West 2005)).
163. Banks, 543 U.S. at 426.
164. American Jobs Creation Act § 703.
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ters worse from a broader perspective. It now seems significantly
less likely in the current political environment that tax legislation
to eliminate the attorneys' fee problem will emerge.
The Court's Banks decision purported to set forth a general
rule that attorneys' fees will be included in plaintiffs' gross income
even if paid directly to their contingent fee attorney.165 Plainly,
though, the Court left open certain avenues by which taxpayers
will continue to seek creative methods of avoiding the unfortunate
result dictated by Banks. Indeed, few would argue that the Banks
approach is equitable. Several recent post-Banks cases suggest
that courts may consider both the statutory fee argument and the
partnership skeptically, but taxpayers are likely to continue to as-
sert these arguments, providing additional tax cases on this point
in the future.
Other planning opportunities may surface. Taxpayers, tax
advisers, the IRS, and the courts all need time to digest the
Court's ruling and its impact. Bear in mind, too, that all this
comes on the heels of the Jobs Act, which itself is hardly a model
of clarity.
This article has speculated whether the employment claim fo-
cus of the Jobs Act, coupled with the IRS's victory in Banks, in-
vites allocation. Thus, in the typical mixed-claim litigation, the
IRS may seek to allocate fees between "good" employment claims
(that give rise to an above-the-line attorneys' fee deduction) and
other "bad" claims. If the IRS bifurcates cases, then the Banks
rule, with its various exceptions, will become that much more im-
portant.
165. Banks, 543 U.S. at 429.
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